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Abstract
The investment profile and particularly the horizon of traditional debt financing for projects
seldom matches the returns on assets, particularly in the resources and infrastructure sectors
where assets have a lengthy construction phase before realising a return. This mismatch in
investment duration and risk-return profile is a key weakness of the Western approach to
limited recourse borrowing under project financing conventions. The motives underlying
Islamic finance however differ from the Western approach permitting longer-term investments
and profit-sharing arrangements, subject to the strict practice of Shari´ah law. This paper
highlights the advantages of Islamic investment practices over traditional approaches in
project financing which can potentially fill a significant gap in funding options for firms in the
global resources sector.
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Introduction
Companies in capital-intensive industries are increasingly using project finance to
fund large-scale capital expenditures. Over 2001-10 on average private companies
have deployed over $200 billion per annumglobally in project finance (Niehuss,
2010). Islamic finance now makes up around 30 percent of the project finance market
in the Arab Gulf states. The decision to use project finance involves an explicit choice
regarding both organizational form and financial structure. With project finance,
sponsoring firms create legally distinct entities to develop, manage and finance a
particular project. These entities borrow on a limited or nonrecourse basis, which
places heavier reliance on loan repayments securitized by the project’s cash flows
rather than on the assets or general credit of the sponsoring organizations. Despite the
non-recourse nature of borrowing for capital outlay, projects are generally highly
leveraged entities, especially in the resources sector. Debt to total capitalization ratios
average 60-70 percent (Esty, 2005) but are often as high as 95 percent.
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Traditional sources of debt are not a perfect match for project finance opportunities.
Often significant differences arise in the investment horizon, cash flow profile and
appetite for risk given the complex nature of some projects(Davis, 2005). Thekey
question is if firms use project finance as an alternative to traditional on-balance sheet
corporate finance, is there a natural source of capital whose characteristicsmatch the
risk and return profiles of capital-intensive industries? While recent research has
made progress in answering the broader question relating to the use of project
financing, little research has been conducted in identifying the ideal investment
profile of backersincapital-intensive industries.
Themajor limitation of project finance options available to companies in resources
and extractive industriesis the allowable duration for debt financing. Western
financial institutions hesitate to engage in limited recourse borrowing arrangements
beyond seven years and certainly ten years is generally the longest horizon for non-
government supported capital investments. Projects developed in the resources sector
can often take at least seven to ten years just to return positive cash flows, especially
ones that require substantial downstream infrastructure development fortransporting
commodities to buyers. As resource projects become more complex and are
conducted in regions subject to higher political and economic risks, the investment
horizons are becoming greater, with the subsequent retreat of project funding interest
from Western banks (Javaid, 2011). This widening gap however appears well suited
to the more patient and long-term investment horizons sought by Islamic funds,
despite the stricter conditions under which funding may be provided.
With the gradual abatement of the 2008 credit and financial crisis,firms in the
resources sector are seeking financing from investors and creditors whose investment
horizon constraints are less limited that traditional commercial bank financing. Some
firms in the sector are actively seeking to convert their traditional loan agreements
into Shari´ah-based loans for two reasons. First, the curtailed eagerness of Western
banks to fund risky long-term development has accelerated the search for alternatives.
Second, Shari´ahinvestors are seen to be more forgiving to borrowers experiencing
troubled times than Western banks. One key idea that is generating this interest is that
Islamic funding resembles aninvestment partnership rather than a formallegal debtor-
creditor agreement (Lewis, 2008;Rehman,2008), implying that suchfunding contains
greater flexibility and can remain in place over a much longer term. Proponents of
Islamic funding claim that links withShari´ahfinanciers are a lot more secure than
relationships with Western banks (Hasan, 2011). For instance, despite Western banks
permitting smallercosts on exit than their Shari´ah investor counterparts, they still
retain great flexibility to abandon the project when trouble looms.
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This paper discusses the use of Islamic funds for project financing activities in
capital-intensive industries with particular reference to the resources sector, and
explores the risk-return profile of Shari´ah-compliant investors. With respect to a
number of case studies we show that within the constraints of Shari´ah law Islamic
funds are suited for project financing opportunities inthe resources sector and possess
many advantages over traditional sources of financing.
Project Financing
Under the trade-off theory of capital structure a firm should increase leverage to the
point where the marginal gain from incremental tax shields equals the marginal loss
from incremental distress costs (Harris and Raviv,1991). The total expected cost of
distress is equal to the product of the probability of distress and the cost of distress.
These include both direct and indirect costs such as reputation damage and missed
investment opportunities. The probability that a company will incur significant
distress costs depends heavily on its leverage and asset risk. For a given level of asset
risk, the probability of distress increases with leverage. Alternatively for a given
leverage ratio the probability of distress increases with asset risk. Shareholders sell
the safest cash flows to creditors who agree to forgo the upside potential in return for
taking a senior claim on the cash flows. With low-risk assets shareholders can sell a
majority of the expected cash flows to debt-holders and in return obtain interest tax
shields. The reduction in cash flow volatility allows firms to add leverage and
increase value from interest tax shields. In the resources sector many projects have
relatively low asset risk but can accommodate a correspondingly high level of debt
(Esty, 2005). This phenomenon has led to a growth in the debt financing of specific
assets securitized by expected cash flows and the asset itself. The most popular
mechanism used for this approach is project financing.
Project finance became an established vehicle for companies seeking new ways to
finance large natural resource discoveries in the 1970s. Using project finance, British
Petroleum raised $945 million to develop an oil and gas platform in the North Sea
and then Freeport Minerals raised $120 million for the Ertsberg copper mine in
Indonesia.Project finance is popular in the resources sector because projects can be
easily structured as entities legally separated from their sponsors. A great number of
resource projects have since been funded using project financing techniques. The
major benefits of project financing relate to risks associated with information costs,
credit risk and sovereign risk which are key considerations for the resources sector.
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The Limits of Project Finance
At its core project financing is a form of asset-based financial engineering. It offers
certain advantages over traditional forms of corporate financing but its use in the
natural resources sector is constrained by two key factors: a general mismatch in the
investment horizon between creditor expectations and actual asset returns, and a
diminished tolerance for lower than expected cash flows.
The investment horizon of institutions willing to facilitate project financing has
steadily decreased over 2007-12 and is unlikely to improve while credit markets
remain tight. Table 1 illustrates the change in investment appetite over 2006-12 with
respect to project financing in the global energy sector. On average interest rate
spreads have increased from around 110 bps to nearly 400 bps. The spread of BBB-
rated bonds in 2011-12 is 130 bps lower than project financing facility costs of assets
with a similar credit rating which indicates that the appetite to finance longer-term
projects is likely to diminish during periods of relative credit scarcity.In addition the
number of syndicated banks in a typical project has grown from around 3 to 8, the
average size of deals has decreasedfrom US$938 million to US$772 million and the
number of institutions actively engaged in project financing has decreased markedly
(Simshauser and Nelson, 2012).Table2 illustrates the average tenor, average facility
spread and average size of all global project financing deals in the energy sector over
1981-2007 and 2008-2011. This result highlights the general decline in risk appetite
for project financing as an investment class evident by a decline in the average
facility size and an increase in credit spreads.
2006-07 2008-09 2011-12
PF spreads (bp) 110 425 375
BBB bond spread (bp) 85 360 240
PF-BBB spread (bp) 25 65 135
Max tenor (yrs) 12 3 7
Max gearing 65% 55% 60%
MLA Banks ≤3 8 8
Syndication Banks ≤3 Club deal 8
Active Banks 29 11 14
Table 1: Average spread over LIBOR, comparative BBB-rated bond spreads, maximum tenor
and gearing and the number of financial institutions engaging in project financing in the
energy sector, 2006-12. Source: AGL Research, Simshauser and Nelson (2012).
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Number of
PFs
Average
facility spread
(bp)
Average
facility size
(US$)
Global
syndicated
debt (US$)
1981-2007 2,028 143 938.0 1,902,198
2008-2011 1,112 236 772.3 858,800
Total 3,140 176 879.3 2,760,997
Table 2: Global project financing deals, average facility spread and average size in the energy
sector in 2011 US$, 1981-2011. Source: AGL Research, Simshauser and Nelson (2012).
Short term variations in cash flows also create concerns for project financiers. The
potential for low or negative cash flows, even over short periods, is monitored
carefully by project financiers who have historically not been shy to invoke default
actions upon a project experiencing minor difficulties. Financing is not viewed as a
form of partnership between lender(s) and borrower but is seen in the more traditional
sense of debtor and creditor. Indeed legally the differences are trivial. An avenue is
therefore available for new sources of funding that employ an alternate investment
model
An Opportunity for Islamic Financing
Shari´ahoffers unique challenges in banking and finance practices. Islamic economic
systems seek to balance economic growth with economic justice, promote prosperity
and job creation and lead to the further adoption of Islamic economic and financial
practices, see Rehman(2008). A distinctive feature of Islamic finance is that itis asset-
based while conventional financiersare monetary-based. ‘Money’ in an Islamic
economy has no intrinsic value; rather its principle purpose is asa medium of
exchange. This attracts greater emphasis in Islamic systems than it does in the West.
Financing under Islamic principles is typically based on the exchange of, in general,
non-liquid assets with the principle aim being to create real assets and inventories.
The basic innovations in Islamic project financing in the past decade include the use
of istisna (a commission to manufacture contract), murābaha (a cost-plus sale), ijara
(a financial lease) and sukuk (an Islamic bond) among others as explored in (Dusuki,
2007).
Islamic Financing Considerations
Mushāraka(partnership finance) and mudāraba(venture capital finance) are the real
and ideal types of Islamic financing respectively, both of which imply partnerships
and the sharing of profits. In practice however most Islamic banks apply murābaha, a
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mark-up method of financing trade, which involves relatively little risk for a bank. A
murābaha contract occurs where a financial institution purchases an asset, takes title
to it and then resells it to the customer at a certain profit added to the cost. While
there is confusion concerning the acceptability of murābaha it has been suggested
that it is a sale contract rather than a loan, and the transaction being financed must
involve a real ‘commodity,’ see Usmani(2002). The financier must therefore own the
‘commodity,’ and it is this legal responsibility that justifies the financier’s mark-up.
Where direct purchase by the financier for resale may not be feasible, under Shari´ah
it is permissible for the bank to appoint the client as its agent to purchase the
commodity. In this case, it is still the bank that assumes responsibility for any risks
involving the commodity. A number of Islamic jurisdictions state that murābaha debt
cannot be securitized, thus making sukuk backed by pools of murābaha debt
impermissible. The sale of a document representing money is judged to be the same
as trading money and thus violates the principle of riba. However the prevailing view
among less conservative jurisdictions is that so long as the underlying receivable is
connected to a true trade transaction or to a commercial transfer of a non-monetary
interest, such a receivable can be traded freely without violating compliance with
Shari´ah, see Abdel-Khaleq and Richardson(2007).
There has been some discussion in the literature of the rights and liabilities of those
participating in mushāraka and mudārabafinancing contracts, see McMillen(2001),
Usmani (2002) and Mahlknecht (2009). All partners have the right to take part in the
management of a mushāraka company but their remuneration as agents working for
the joint venture is distinct from their returns as investors. Unless stipulated in the
initial agreement, any partner has the right to terminate a mushārakaagreement at any
time, although a period of notice must be given to the other partners. To prevent a
partner withdrawing from a mushārakain its infancy, which may damage the longer-
term financial interests of the other partners, it ispermissible to establish an initial
agreement that allows a partner to sell his shareholding to the other partners, without
the mushārakalapsing (Rehman, 2008). This is an important consideration for
syndicated offerings and has been explored in other settings such as housing finance
(Smolo and Hassan, 2011) and natural resource development in the Organization of
Islamic Conference member states (Abdul-Mumin and Siwar, 2011).
Sukuk offerings are perhaps the most malleable of the Islamic financing structures. A
sukuk offering is an asset-backed instrument that represents a beneficial ownership
interest in an underlying asset. Sukuk is a certificate that appears like a traditional
bond or asset-backed security but is in fact technically neither debt nor equity. Sukuk
are normally combined with other forms of Islamic finance (many are mushāraka-
based), and they are best viewed as a means to raise funds from a wider spectrum of
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investors rather than an entirely separate category of Islamic banking (Richardson,
2006). Any project structure that generates or contributes to the generation of a
revenue stream is subject to securitization for the purposes of a sukuk offering. A true
asset-backed sukuk is functionally a portion of the title in the assets under it, and as
such, it enables a form of partial retention of title for the Islamic financiers (Rosly,
2010).
Retention of title
A key consideration for structuring Shari´ah-compliant project financing is to ensure
that the Islamic financier retains title in the operating assets of the project aligned
with the practice of murābaha. This stems from the Shari´ah requirement that the
financier share in the profits and losses of the transaction, see Holden(2007).
Structuring projects to accommodate this requirement paves the way for Western
financial institutions to cooperate in project financingwith Islamic institutions, and
overcomes many Shari´ah prohibitions. Title retention for the Islamic participants not
only facilitates the participation of external interests in projects, but also allows for
the participation of Shari´ah-compliant financing in almost all regions and investment
sectors.
Western lending practices do not call for retention of title of the assets and generally
evaluate projected cash flows from the project to determine the likelihood of
repayment. Instead of retaining title Western lenders will take a security interest in
the project assets to mitigate the risk of default. In project finance, a security interest
is a right of a lender to possess and/or sell the project assets in order to satisfy debts to
the lender in the event of default. While security interest in the project assets will not
completely cover the loan, the nature of the security does provide some protection in
the event of default. If the project defaults the Western lenders’ security interest
provides them with a claim to the assets that takes precedence over other unsecured
claims.
If the project defaults, the Islamic lender will already possess title to the project assets
that the Islamic funds helped purchase. The Islamic lenders can therefore dispose of
the assets to satisfy the outstanding debt obligations. A rahn-adl arrangement can
satisfy the dual purpose of allowing for the retention of title in the project assets with
Islamic lenders while also enabling Western lenders to have a security interest in the
financed assets. From the lender’s perspective, a Western security interest and Islamic
title retention can function similarly if the project defaults, see Richardson (2006).
However it is seldom the case that only a single lender issues a single tranche of debt
and as projects grow in size and complexity, the distinction between title and
securitization can be a complication though recent experience has shown that this
complication does not provide insurmountable obstacles (Rehman, 2008).
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Limited-recourse lending using Shari´ah funds
Shari´ah-compliant project financing is available in Western nations via a mechanism
that retains title in the project’s assets by the Islamic lenders. Sukuk offerings are
popular in the Middle East. Most offerings are asset-based meaning that investors
structure the purchase from the originator to buy back the assets on either a scheduled
or early redemption. In contrast, the less common asset-backed securities issued by
Islamic finance institutions rely on a securitization that involves asset transfers from
an originator into a trust or similar SPV with sukuk issuance by that SPV and
payments on the sukuk derived from the payments received in respect of those
transferred assets. Asset-backed sukuk holders hold fractional undivided ownership
interest in an asset or pool of assets and are thus a form of partial title in the
underlying asset. Asset-based sukuk necessarily depends on the credit of the issuer.
Historically asset securitization has been rare due to the inability to obtain credit
ratings, although some sovereign issues have been proxy rated to match the rating of
sovereign credit see McMillen(2001).
Shari´ah funding for the resources sector
Of great interest to Shari´ah -compliant financing is the possibility of joint ownership
of mineral rights, the ability to transfer a mineral estate without transferring property
and the ability to separate operating interest from a passive interest that receives only
income from production. The ability to carve out well-defined interests with clearly
established attendant rights under law fits appropriately with the Shari´ah emphasis
on ensuring clarity in the description of the subject matter in the investment
agreements.
In many developed countries such as the US, Canada and Australia, mineral estates
(ownership of minerals or oil/gas in the ground) and interests derived from them
(royalties) are legally defined as a form of real property. As real property with well-
defined rights in law ownership in mineral projects can be easily transferred, in whole
or in part, in a variety of ways. Both privately-owned and government-administered
mineral leases can be severed, subleased, assigned or encumbered without necessarily
altering their characterization as real property. Mineral rights laws further allow for
the transfer of certain kinds of partial ownership rights, so that one party may control
the working interest and operate the leasehold while other parties may hold passive
royalty interests (investors who neither participate in operations nor bear any costs of
development). Thus ownership can be tailored to the needs of project investors by
allowing for the creation of indirect beneficial ownership interests that can be held by
Islamic investors, which is critical for Shari´ah compliance. Interests in mineral
leaseholds may also enjoy certain protections in bankruptcy which can improve the
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securitization process (Richardson, 2006). Importantly mineral assets can be
mortgaged and investors can hold security interests which permits the maintenance of
collateral in the event of a breach of contract by the borrower. Therefore in terms of
legal structure, Islamic finance and the laws governing minerals and oil/gas in many
developed countries can offer ideal partnership opportunities.
Figure 1 illustrates a Shari´ah-compliant project financing structure for a resources
project. Each component of the project must be Shari´ah-compliant including the
sources of funding (sukuk, mudāraba and murābaha), commodity off-take (Shari´ah-
compliant formal undertaking), construction contracts (istisna'a) and leases (ijara).
Mining project
Commodity
Off-take
Under a supply
agreement
Equipment
lease
Construction
contract
Mining
contractors
Labour
Diesel, water,
explosives,
power, parts
Equity
Shareholder
agreement
Board of Directors
Sponsor A Sponsor B Sponsor C
20%
80%
Non-recourse
debt
Inter creditor
agreement
Bond
offering
Export credit
agency
Bank
syndicate
Istisna
agreement
Ijara
agreement
Shari´ah-
compliant
Murābaha assets
(take title over
asset portion)
Sukuk
offering
Declaration
of trust
Formal
undertaking to
purchase
commodities
Commodities
Murābaha
assets
Periodic
redemptions
Mudāraba
agreements
Periodic
redemptions
Istisna
agreement
Issuing agent
(SPV)
Sukuk
certificates
Figure 1: Project finance structure for a resource project using Shari´ah-compliant financing.
An ijara agreement is an Islamic finance lease (or sale-leaseback) used to purchase
property, plant or machinery, see Tacy (2006). The lessor leases the assets for a set
term at an established rental price and at lease termination the assets can either revert
back to the lessor or be acquired by the lessee. Unlike traditional leases, there can be
no predetermined sales price for the asset at the end of the term, and the lessee cannot
be required to purchase the asset at the end of the term. Also the financier is generally
responsible for maintaining insurance. Therefore ijara are more akin to operating
leases rather than capital leases. In the context of the resources sector an ijara is an
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ideal mechanism for leveraged lease financing of capital equipment including
processing plants, trucks, deepwater platforms and drillships. Critically however in
the context of a sukuk offering the value of such equipment should not represent a
material percentage of the total financing amount, see Vishwanath and Azmi(2009).
Ijara agreements are not prevalent in the resources sector however they are a legally
robust substitute for conventional leverage lease or sale-leaseback structures within
Shari´ah-compliant financing. In contrast istisna'a is a vehicle for the financing of
large infrastructure projects and is currently the most widely used Shari´ah compliant
funding of long-term project financings. With istisna'a agreements assets are
constructed for the project. Such assets can include processing plants, rail and port
facilities, refineries and petrochemical plants.
The Investment Profiles of Loan Facilities
Anecdotal observations indicate that Western financial institutions tend to avoid
commitment to investment tenors greater than around 7 years, see Gilson, John and
Lang(1990) and Esty and Megginson(2003). This has resulted in the adoption of
alternative project finance structures over the past decade. The generally high cost of
resource projects as well as other inefficiencies in the business cycle over 2000-12
has also resulted in a shortening of the maturity of liabilities manifest in the
shortening of debt maturities, see Mian and Santos(2011). Frictions arising from
asymmetric information are more severe at longer horizons relative to shorter
horizons and so beyond a certain maturity adverse selection is too severe for
financing to be sustained. Specifically there is asymmetric information about the
riskiness and default probabilities of firms.
To analyze the differences between sources of funding for the resources sector we
examine a sample of data that compares loan statistics among categories. The non-
Islamic data for the period 1980-1999 used in this analysis is the Loanware database
provided by Capital Data. This database contains detailed historical information on a
great number of syndicated loans and related banking instruments booked on
international capital markets. From 1999-2010 the data was sourced from Thomson
Reuters financial database. In each case we only extracted data related to the global
mining and natural resources sector. Using a sample of over 10,000 syndicated loans
with a notional value of around US$3 trillion we compare the financial characteristics
and geographic and industrial distributions of project financed loans with various
non-project finance sub-samples and syndicated loans. Islamic fund data was
obtained from the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) Bahrain database over the
period 1980-2010.
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Table 3 illustrates the main characteristics of each loan type used by firms in the
global resources sector. The table presents several loan structure variables as well as
the use for which a loan is arranged. While most are self-explanatory we define a loan
as having currency risk if the denomination of the loan (and its currency of
repayment) differs from the currency of the borrower’s home country. The data
results over 1980-2000 are largely similar to the mining and natural resources data
observed in Kleimeier and Megginson(2000) which we have used to cross-reference
our results.The third column provides the main characteristics of all known sukuk
offerings over 1980-2010 from the LMC database.
Based on t-tests comparing the values of each variable in the project financing sample
with the corresponding values in the all syndicated loan sample and in the other loan
purpose sub-samples, we found that almost all differences between the project
financing sample values and the corresponding values for other loan categories, in
particular with sukuk offerings, are statistically significant.
Average spreads are lower for project finance loans (132 bps) than they are for the
full sample of all syndicated loans (141 bps), treasury loans (185 bps) and capital
structure facilities (139 bps). It is generally assumed that the spread for project
finance facilities exceeds non-project finance loans due to the nature of limited-
recourse lending as well as the higher perceived risk levels of most projects. The
average maturity of project finance facilities (9.6 years) is well in excess of full
sample of syndicated loans (4.2 years) and other facility types (between 4 and 5.1
years). The average spread for sukuk offerings observed over the period was 137 bps
with an average maturity of 7.4 years which is similar to project finance facility
spreads and tenors. This implies that sukuk buyers are already relatively comfortable
with these risk levels for assets with longer-maturities.
The level of fees and the number of participating institutions indirectly indicates that
the provision of project finance facilities demand greater compensation than other
loan types. The total average levels for commitment and participation fees for project
finance facilities (101.3 bps) are significantly higher than the levels for the full
sample of syndicated loans (76.3 bps) and for the other facility types with an
exception for general corporate loans which have a slightly higher total average fee.
The total fees are, however, largely similar to the total average level for commitment
and participation fees for sukuk offerings (114 bps) indicating a relative alignment in
complexity of both project finance and sukuk facilities. Additionally, the average
number of banks participating in project finance facilities in the resources sector (4.1
banks) is different from the average for all loans in the resources sector (7.3 banks)
and other loan types.
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All
syndicated
loans
Project
finance
loans
All sukuk
issues
Corporate
treasury
loans
General
corporate
loans
Capital
structure
loans
Total loans^ 1,356 311 291 227 466 288
Total volume ($US bn)^ 197,211 29,230 17,996 40,258 47,995 68,529
Average loan size ($US
m)
128* 92 298* 177* 85* 181*
Median loan size ($US
m)^
70 81 200 85 50 100
Average tranches 1.7* 2.4 2.5* 2.5* 1.4 1.7
Average spread (over
LIBOR, bp)
141* 132 137* 185* 115* 139*
Average maturity (yrs) 4.2* 9.6 7.4* 5.1* 4.0 4.2*
Average number of
syndicate banks
7.3* 4.1 4.2* 2.7* 3.8* 6.6
Average initial fee (bp) 41* 44 84* 39.5* 36* 33.7*
Maximum participation
fee (bp)
35.3* 57.3 30* 56.1* 32.7* 34.1*
Currency exposed loans
(%)^
36.7 72.9 77.9 11.5 45.0 22.2
Loans with covenants
(%)^
37.2 5.8 7.2 46.6 21.3 46.4
Loans with guarantees
(%)^
16.7 45.6 5.5 8.8 14.3 14.1
Table 3: Characteristics of project finance versus other syndicated loan samples. * indicates
that based on a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances, the difference between the
value for this facility and the value for project financing is significant at 5 percent
significance. All other values are not statistically significant at 5 percent or higher. ^ indicates
that the t-test has not been applied to these variables.
These findingssuggest that institutionsare compensated by relatively high up-front
fees to motivate participation in project finance lending as well as being generallyless
inclined to maintain large stakes in project finance facilities compared with other
forms of credit.
These results also suggest that in terms of facility tenor, spread over LIBOR,
structuring cost, the number of tranches and the number of syndication parties, the
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sukuk offerings are very similar to project financing deals observed, while other
traditional loan facilities exhibit a significantly different facility size and tenor and
number of average syndication parties. They key characteristics of spread and
maturity however show that project finance facilities in the resources sector are
largely aligned with the risk and loan maturity levels observed for Islamic fund
investors.
0% 100% 200% 300%
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
PV[(Asset Value – Initial Cost)/Initial Cost]
Islamic
Non-Islamic
PF
Figure 2: Distribution of asset returns from Islamic and non-Islamic project financing
measured against project-financed investments in the resources sector, 2000-12.
Figure 2 outlines the distribution of asset returns from explicit Islamic and non-
Islamic project financing deals measured against project-financed investments in the
resources sector over 2000-12 using the same data sets as above. Asset returns are
given as the present value of the current estimated asset value relative to the initial
investment cost. The distribution of Islamic project finance investments closely
replicates the distribution of project finance facilities in the resources sector,
particularly at the upper and lower extremes which indicates a greater tolerance of
Islamic investors to the risks and returns in natural resources project finance
activities. Non-Islamic investments have a distribution of returns that is highly dense
around the 50-150 percent level which suggests a broad level of risk aversion by non-
Islamic project financiers who look to invest in projects that on average at least break
even. Importantly however they also experience significantly fewer returns than
Islamic project financiers below the 50 percent level. Discounting those projects that
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fail and earn zero return, Islamic investors experience a much broader spread of
returns which is more naturally aligned with the distribution of returns in resource
sector project financiers.
The similarity in investment risk and return profiles, funding costs and facility tenor
suggest that Islamic investors are very well suited to project financing in the global
resources sector. While Islamic funds currently invest heavily in this sector in the
Middle East there appears to be significant alignment between Islamic investors and
resource companies seeking funding through project finance structures.
Examples of Islamic-sourced funds for the resources sector
There are a number of precedents that highlight the success of the Islamic funds
financing projects outside Islamic nations.The first high-profile example of a
Western-based sukuk offering was the financing of oil and gas production activities in
the Gulf of Mexico by the East Cameron Gas Company (ECGC) based in Texas in
2006, Richardson (2006). The project raised $166 million through a sukuk offering to
finance capital and operating costs associated with drilling and operating wells. To
avoid issues associated with riba the funds raised were also used to eliminate
outstanding conventional debt.Importantly thesukuk offer was non-recourse to ECGC,
meaning that if the royalty could not generate sufficient funds, ECGC would not be
obligated to pay the sukuk holders. ECGC thusassumed the risk associated with
below-expected oil/gas production and falling off-take prices. The sukuk offering was
Shari´ah-compliant due to the risk sharing on the part of the sukuk holders as well as
the characterization under Louisiana law of a royalty interest as real property, of
which the sukuk holders held undivided beneficial ownership. This undivided
beneficial ownership could be considered a form of partial title in the royalty interest.
Islamic scholars issued a fatwa approving of the deal, see Richardson(2006). Shari´ah
compliance required theretention of title in the assets underlying the project therefore
investors shared in the project risks and received rental paymentsfrom production in
contrast to traditional interest payments. ECGC was a high-risk project that ultimately
defaulted butthe structure of the facility demonstrates howsukuk offerings combined
with the other necessary forms of Shari´ah-compliant funding are a lucrative source
of funds for project financing in the resources sector.
Non-resources sector examples include the 2005 Jimah Energy Ventures (JEV), a
company owned by the royal family of the Malaysian state of Negeri Sembilan who
raised US$1.6bn to fund the construction of a 1400 MW Greenfield independent
power producer (IPP). Much of the capital was raised by sukuk however the deal also
included a significant amount of conventional finance through a bank guarantee
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facility and a standby letter of credit.2 Long-dated project financing examples where
tenors of 20 years or more have been achieved include the Rabigh IPP in Saudi
Arabia and Shuweihat 2 projects in Abu Dhabi.
Not all project financing deals involve high risk assets. Some firms have used project
finance for activities that have a low cost of financial distress. Many resource projects
contain economically independent but tangible assets that do not lose much value
during default or after restructuring. Because the assets have few alternative uses an
efficient restructuring is generally more likely than an inefficient liquidation, see
Esty(2002). The recognition that projects maintain a similar value to that of a going
concern encourages both subordinate and senior claimants to prefer rapid
restructurings to alternative uncertain outcomes. This phenomenon clearly benefits
Islamic financiers.
One key drawback of Islamic financing is the lack of a forum for reaching consensus
on issues relating to Shari´ah compliance through a regulatory body. The Islamic
Financial Services Board publishes various technical standards for financial
institutions while other institutions including the International Islamic Financial
Market, the Liquidity Management Centre and the International Islamic Rating
Agency lend some support to standardizing Islamic financing principles. However the
regulatory frameworks do not explicitly create a universal set of rules. The lack of
regulation could make Islamic finance more country-specific or even Shari´ah board-
specific, which would limit potential sources of capital. A more uniform approach to
regulation by a sanctioned Shari´ah compliance body can address this deficiency and
permit Islamic and even conventional financial institutions to offer compliant
Shari´ah financing.
Another issue concerning the viability of Islamic financing in some countries is level
and degree of regulation on Islamic banking and financing practices as well as any
legislative measures that may be implemented to accommodate such practices as
highlighted by Ahmad and Hassan(2009). However we expect that although Muslims
and dedicated Islamic banks are in the minority in many resource-rich countries,
regulatory authorities would act to ensure a level playing field among Islamic and
conventional institutions, and may even result in a greater number of conventional
institutions engaging in Shari´ah-compliant financing.
Concluding Remarks
Islamic finance is more suited to certain type of projects than others. Islamic finance
lends itself more to projects that incorporate a discrete set of assets that can be owned
2 “Jimah Energy: Upfront Equity,” Project Finance, London: June 2005.
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by the Islamic financiers without too much potential intrusion on the enjoyment of
such rights by conventional banks under inter-creditor arrangements, see for instance
Jobst(2007). Furthermore the assets owned by the Islamic financiers must be
separable and have an economic value as stand-alone assets. Islamic funding
principles offer a natural fit with the desirable features of project finance
opportunities, particularly in the global resources sector. This is a source of untapped
potential.
The key to Shari´ah compliance is to facilitate the retention of title in the project’s
assets by Islamic lenders. Once the lender has title to these assets they are subject to
the risks of the project and any return on the investment will be in the form of rents
on the assets, as opposed toriba. Shari´ah-compliant financing is well-suited for
project finance due to the nature of the projects typically undertaken in project
finance transactions. Such projects tend to be large industrial or infrastructure projects
whose cash flows can be projected to some extent, which avoids the prohibition on
gharar.So long as the project does not facilitate activity that is haram the project is
generally Shari´ah-compliant.
For Islamic investors project finance opportunities in the resources sector offers an
avenue not only for investment, but also for infrastructure development and economic
diversification. As competition for access to Islamic funds increases those project
finance investors with the greatest understanding and willingness to work with
Shari´ah-compliant finance practices can gain an advantage in accessing an important
alternative source of capital.
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